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Abstract 
During the last two centuries, the military in Latin America has been involved 
in politics in a characteristic duality of professionalism and political ‘calling’, by 
political armies of the right and the left. In both cases, a kind of ‘military mystique’ 
prevails, but its content is different. In both cases, the military justifies its involvement 
as a consequence of its necessary correcting and transforming vanguard role in politics 
and society. The two characteristics of dual functions  (internal and internal security) 
and dual pathways (professionalism and political missions) are a revolving theme in this 
article. 
Introduction: Political armies
Latin America is a continent of political soldiers and military politicians. The 
military profession is often a prelude to a political career. During two centuries of 
independent republics, the militaries have been important, decisive and intermittently 
ruling political actors. In the nineteenth century, caudillos (military officers with an 
armed entourage) took power as military rulers, but from the early twentieth century 
onward, not individual strongmen but the military institution itself became a key 
power broker in almost every country. In this article, I follow the evolution and 
transformation of the Latin American military in politics and society. 
During the entire twentieth century, very few inter-state wars were fought in 
Latin America. At best, one real war, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, 
was waged in the 1930s. Maybe one should add the rather reduced campaigns of the 
El Salvador–Honduras conflict in the 1960s and the Falklands conflict in the early 
1980s where a British expeditionary force defeated an Argentine army detachment. 
Most wars were prolonged, but loose sequences of relatively insignificant military 
skirmishes, whatever their number of casualties. Inter-state conflicts were in fact 
localised micro-wars, generally extended frontier disputes. Latin American countries 
do not have external territorial enemies in the sense of aggressive competitive states. 
Nobody thinks seriously of modern, large-scale warfare scenarios between, for 
instance, Brazil and Guyana, Argentine and Uruguay, Mexico and Guatemala. 
This means that militarism in a conventional sense – meaning the predominance 
of the military institution and its key ideological constructs in shaping national life 
because of real or perceived external security threats2  – is much less visible throughout 
modern Latin American history. In fact, the soldiering of the Latin American military 
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has been confined largely by its acting in internal social and political conflict. There is 
a long tradition of military involvement in persecuting and combating internal enemies, 
by internal warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns. In that sense, the Latin American 
military has demonstrated its proclivity to act as the guardian of the nation, as protector 
of the state against all its threats and all its enemies, sometimes opposing external ones, 
but generally combating enemies within.
As a stabilising force, as disinterested arbiter, as a protecting power of the 
constitution and as guardian of national development, the military intervened in 
political matters, thus becoming ‘political armies’3 After the 1980s, democratic 
transitions have diminished the influence of the higher echelons in the military. In 
part, this has meant a move towards conventional, apolitical professionalism as 
the Latin American military sought new roles in a redefined national, regional and 
global security environment, However, a much more prominent trend has been the 
militarisation of law enforcement in a context of what Arias and Goldstein  typified as 
‘violent democracies’, a scenario where a variety of non-state actors were engaged in 
armed disputes in smaller or larger territories.4
In this historiographic article, I report on the origins and evolution of the Latin 
American military in politics. 
•	 What were and are the main characteristics of military political involvement? 
•	  How does one explain the explosion of military dictatorship in eleven Latin 
American countries? 
•	 What was the power base of the military muscle? 
•	  What about the dual military role of persecuting internal enemies and 
confronting external threats? 
•	 What was the role of para-military deployments? 
•	 Who are the ideologues? 
•	 What is the role of the so-called ‘military intellectuals’? 
•	  What is the legacy of the military dictatorship and/or military co-government 
of the right and the left? 
•	  How does one explain the persistent preference for military presidents in 
uniform or after retirement? 
•	  How should one interpret the manifold new missions in peacetime and 
democracy? 
•	  Is there a risk of recurrent political involvement of the military echelons, 
this time as executive instrumentalisation after a presidential self-coup or 
an eroding democracy?
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I will also refer to the changing context of democracy facing insecurity at the end 
of the twentieth century until the present. What are the new security challenges being 
faced and how do they influence the orientation and role of their military institutions? 
I will argue that some of the new present security problems once again draw the 
military into domestic tasks and roles. To what extent is this only a consequence of 
security policies of democratically elected civilian governments? Or does it still mean 
the actual existence, or the potential threat, of political militarism, even by civilian 
invitation?
Characteristics
In the colonial Portuguese captaincies in general, as well in the Spanish vice-
kingdoms, the first military organisations were militias formed by landlords and 
their subordinated tenants. The Iberian kingdoms also sent small military and naval 
contingents. Iberian military and local militias were engaged in three complementary 
tasks: fighting and controlling the native indigenous population, defence against 
European buccaneers, and frontier skirmishes between rivalling Spanish and the 
Portuguese colonisers. The principal military deployment was campaigning against 
‘wild’ and rebellious indigenous warriors who assaulted colonial villages or tried 
to re-establish indigenous empires. Loveman who reviewed the nineteenth-century 
constitutions and organic laws in Spanish America and Brazil, concludes that these 
provided the armed forces with a legal role expansion far beyond conventional defence 
tasks.5 Analysing the regimes of exception in nineteenth-century Latin America, he 
uses the term “constitutional tyrannies”. 
Political armies emerged during the last decades of the nineteenth century and re-
appeared between the 1930s and the 1950s. Especially during the Cold War, military 
juntas (commanders of the army, navy and air force) were time and again collective 
heads of state and governments in most countries in the region. The Latin American 
military corporate ethos, in their own terms, the military mystique, which implied a 
certain calling and moral responsibilities (mística militar in Spanish and Portuguese), had 
legitimising notions. Civilian politicians will emphasise that military men and women 
are sons and daughters of the nation. Military ideologues will underline the relationship 
of unity, even kinship, between the military and the national population. However, 
they are especially inclined to formulate these bonds in terms of fathers of the Patria, 
implying the need to protect the nation and its basic interests, which in its turn justified 
the necessity of intervention in times of crisis. It also means a sometimes benevolent 
and sometimes punitive stance with respect to the civilian population in terms of fathers 
versus children, adults versus adolescents, strong leadership versus weak followers.6 
One can discern persistent beliefs.7 Firstly, the military as institution claims a 
certain ‘birthright’ (sometimes real; at other times supposed), which enables it to 
perceive the national interests and destiny unmistakably and to define the strategies for 
national development.8 Then there is the idea of non-political competence in matters of 
planning, technology and efficiency, in which militaries are specially trained to acquire 
proficiency. Thirdly, there is the conviction that officers are selected because of their 
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aptness for unselfish sacrifice (‘we give our life’) and special military virtues such 
as discipline, valour, rectitude, self-denial and patriotism. Fourthly, militaries represent 
par excellence the vigorous unity of the nation, and they have the willpower to achieve 
and sustain it notwithstanding hardship and danger. Lastly, the militaries are inclined to 
believe that civilian politicians represent at best class interests instead of global national 
welfare. Thus, civilians are divided, self-interested and maybe corrupt, and in any case 
inadequate, in times of crisis. Military leadership as the ultimate protectors of the nations 
is oriented to stability and resolve. 
Institutional coups
The paradoxical duality of military professionalism and political ‘calling’ has been 
an ongoing theme over the last 75 years. I will make a distinction between political 
armies of the right and the left. In both cases, a kind of military mystique prevails, but its 
content is different. Political armies of the right are in general heavy-handed, repressive 
regimes (dictatorships or civil–military governments) supporting elite and middle-class 
interests and repressing ‘enemies of the nation’. But political armies can also gyrate 
to the left (pro-poor military governments with popular support) while implementing 
reformist political projects intended to favour the poor, underprivileged and excluded. 
The military institutions of eleven Latin American countries established long-term 
military-led governments between 1964 and 1990: 
•	 Ecuador (1963–1966, 1972–1978), 
•	 Guatemala (1963–1985), 
•	 Brazil (1964–1985), 
•	 Bolivia (1964–1970, 1971–1982), 
•	 Argentina (1966–1973, 1976–1983), 
•	 Peru (1968–1980), 
•	 Panama (1968–1989), 
•	 Honduras (1963–1966, 1972–1982), 
•	 Chile (1973–1990), 
•	 (Uruguay, 1973–1984), and
•	  in El Salvador, the military governed de facto between 1948 and 1984.9
When the long period of military governments came to its end in the late 1980, the 
military concern for the fate of the nations only diminished and became more latent, 
but it never disappeared. 
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Security doctrines and military intellectuals 
Latin American geopolitical scholarship was shaped in the late nineteenth and 
the early twentieth century, when most regional governments invited European 
military missions to train the officers’ corps and to create armies by force of selective 
conscription.10 Their influence lasted until the Second World War. After 1945, US 
military assistance imported its own brand of geopolitical preferences. 
The Cold War reinforced the US hegemony in military- and security-related 
assistance to Latin America. This development aid was originally mostly military, 
gradually combined with support from the new American intelligence community 
(especially the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], afterwards also the Drug 
Enforcement Administration [DEA]). Under the US umbrella thesis of ‘continental 
security’, the complementary domestic thesis of ‘national security’ merged with the 
geopolitical Latin American military tradition. The authors of these theses were a 
new brand of Latin American officers, ‘military intellectuals’ of the staff schools and 
training institutes. 
In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, these intellectuals provided coherent 
ideologies in which the formal role of the armed forces was expanded: from 
defence against territorial attacks and foreign enemies to an active contribution to 
national development with the identification of problems and threats, solutions for 
overcoming development obstacles, civil–military planning and solutions. Future 
Chilean President, General Pinochet, published his geopolitical lectures in the 1960s 
and 1970s, as did future Peruvian Prime Minister and Minister of Defence General 
Mercado Jarrín. His future colleague as Minister of Defence in Guatemala, General 
Gramajo, followed his example in the 1980s. In fact, the functions of geopolitical 
scholar, intelligence director, military strategist, military intellectual and military 
president or prime minister were an integral part of the career moves of leading 
military in Brazil (Golbery do Couto e Silva11), Chile (Pinochet12), Peru (Mercado 
Jarrín13) and Guatemala (Gramajo14).
Three of the Latin American countries deeply affected by their military 
governments in Brazil, Guatemala and Peru, created influential study centres, where 
military intellectuals lectured, wrote, thought and prospered. These academies were 
established both for military officers (colonels and brigadiers) and for civil servants 
(senior technocrats, entrepreneurs, academics, labour leaders and journalists). The 
Brazilian and Peruvian higher civil military schools, the Escola Superior de Guerra 
(ESG), and the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) were created in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, long before the military coups of 1964 (Brazil) and 1968 (Peru). 
Their ideological influence on the mystique of the subsequent military governments is 
undeniable.15 
The ESG was created in 1949, and was modelled after the US War College.16 From 
its inception, the ESG highlighted the need for a strong army presence in planning, 
economic development, industry and agriculture to overcome underdevelopment 
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in Brazil. Fostering a civilian elite of competent planners and technocrats at the 
ministries and supporting national and regional entrepreneurship was also considered 
a core necessity. Their acknowledgement of and conformity with the ideas of 
Brazilian national security were considered essential. Golbery, the chief theoretician, 
emphasised national unity and productive capacity of the entire nation as vital. In 
the 1960s, the emphasis on counterinsurgency and irregular counter-guerrilla warfare 
(more than strictly territorial defence) gradually increased, eventually to reach 222 
versus 21 hours of study in 1968. Eminent military and civilian professors, even 
ministers in function, augmented the prestige of the ESG. 
The CAEM was created in 1950. Its founder, General Marín, a nationalist rather than 
an anti-communist or pro-American, turned on the UN regional office ECLAC (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) in Santiago de 
Chile where Prebisch and his colleagues had launched concepts like ‘underdevelopment’ 
and ‘centre-periphery’. By the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the alumni wrote 
theses dealing with topics such as development planning for the Amazon region, and 
Andean agriculture. In the 1960s, the CAEM staff lectured on ‘integral development’ 
and the leading progressive scholars, on history, anthropology, philosophy and political 
ideas. In fact, nearly all the colonels who prepared the Velasco coup of 1968 were 
members of Velasco’s advisory group, were previously intelligence officers, and then 
put in charge of the counterinsurgency operations against the guerrilla movements 
in the mid-1960s. They secretly convened in study groups where they discussed the 
ideas of Peruvian Marxist historian and anthropologist Mariátegui, and decided that 
not the guerrilla members, but the landed elite were the real enemies within. They 
further argued that they needed a series of structural reforms as the only remedy 
against poverty, exclusion and imperialism, the real causes of the insurgency. 
In Guatemala, the Centro de Estudios Estratégicos Nacionales (Centro ESTNA) 
was founded in 1988, as a think-tank of the Fundación para el Desarrollo Institucional 
de Guatemala (DIG). Contrary to its predecessors in Brazil and Peru, it was established 
as a post-civil war civil–military graduate school. It functioned during the period of 
military tutelage until the late 1990s.17 
Military of the right
In many countries of the region, the Cold War was a period of persecution, 
repression and civil war. Military coups became institutionalised.18 The first 
institutional coup took place in Peru in 1962. But the most important one was the 
military takeover in Brazil, in 1964.19 This latter coup was planned after explicit 
consultation with the national elite and with US government representatives.20 The 
Brazilian example gave rise to a sequence of Latin American dictatorships, afterwards 
known as ‘national security regimes’, of right-wing military army leaders where a 
succession of military cabinet members in military or civil–military governments was 
arranged by internal promotions within the army, the navy and the air force.21 
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Many of these regimes were at war with their own society, persecuting ‘enemies 
within’ and in some cases, explicitly engaged in internal warfare. Their ideology 
was one of fervent anti-communism, the product of ‘exotic theories’, according to 
Argentinean army chiefs. They fought counterinsurgency wars against ‘subversive’ 
or ‘terrorist’ adversaries, real (members of guerrilla movements) or imagined (the 
leadership of trade unions and peasant associations, left-wing writers and students, 
journalists and priests). In the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and 
especially Central America, the counterinsurgency campaigns took the form of dirty 
warfare: state terrorism, including widespread torture, assassinations and disappearances, 
even amounting to genocide (in the case of Guatemala).22 In Brazil and the Southern 
Cone countries, repression was carried out not only to deal with known adversaries, 
but also to instil fear within society. Open civil war in Central America followed the 
same basic pattern of conflict leading to an even much larger number of victims. 
The military muscle of the dictatorships was based on three components: control 
over the national system of intelligence and security forces, the predominance of the 
military over the police forces, and the already mentioned military missions of local 
and regional development in remote areas. Of these three factors, control over security 
and intelligence was the most important. The internal wars against subversion were 
conducted by an array of parallel services: military intelligence, the security organs, 
the police, para-military groups and death squads and combinations thereof. As the 
backbone of the counterinsurgency operations, the intelligence and security systems 
expanded to such a degree that their official and unofficial ties with paramilitary units 
became difficult to distinguish.23 
The use of paramilitary forces as auxiliary deterrent and local enforcement could 
take grotesque forms. Semi-governmental vigilantes, such as the AAA (Argentine 
Anti-Communist Alliance or Triple A) in Argentina, two parallel paramilitary forces 
in El Salvador, and particularly the Self-Defence Patrols (PACs) in Guatemala, 
terrorised their countries. At the height of the counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Guatemala, the army forcefully incorporated more than a million indigenous ‘civil 
patrol members’, probably half of the entire indigenous adult male population, out of 
a national population of nine million.24 
In addition, elected presidents of countries engaged in guerrilla warfare made 
ample use of paramilitary formations. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, during the 
counterinsurgency operations of the Fujimori government against the Maoist guerrilla 
group, Shining Path, the Peruvian Army eventually armed around 400 000 indigenous 
paramilitary troops (ronderos in Peruvian Spanish), operating under authority of the 
local commanding officers. Their presence was the decisive factor with respect to the 
victory over this guerrilla group.25 
Over many years, the Colombian Army maintained close ties with private armies, 
regional paramilitary forces that were finally unified into the umbrella organisation 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The most recent report of the Colombian 
Centro de la Memoria Histórica attributes 70% of the victims of massacres to the 
campaigns of the army and the paramilitary forces.26
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During the Cold War, the military right was supported by the United States. The 
United States had already established a tradition of political policing by military 
intervention in the Americas. According to the database of Becker, between 1890 and 
2009, the Americans intervened 62 times with regular troops, Special Forces, covert 
action operators and paramilitary forces.27 There was at least a state of complicity – 
Operation Condor, an intelligence, death squad and dirty warfare cooperation structure 
between the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and 
Uruguay.28 Less documented is the role of Argentina in intelligence and dirty warfare 
support in Central America, before the United State took over.29
Coups and coup efforts of militaries of the right did not completely cease in 
the twenty-first century. In 2002, a coup against elected leftist President Chávez of 
Venezuela eventually failed after several days. In 2004, after a period of conflict 
between armed groups and the Haitian security forces, leftist elected President 
Aristide was ousted by US forces and set on a plane to the Central African Republic. 
In 2009, Honduran military forces captured leftist elected President Zelaya, and flew 
him to Costa Rica. In 2010, police and military officers tried to remove leftist elected 
Ecuadorean President Correa. He was liberated by loyal military.
Maybe the Honduran coup was the most explicit and violent removal of an elected 
president. Zelaya, a rich landowner, evolved during his government term to a leftist 
‘spokesman of the urban and rural poor’ who flirted with the idea of an alliance with 
Cuban and Venezuelan politics to become a member of the string of other ALBA 
countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and several smaller Caribbean island 
states.30 His adversaries discovered ‘communism’ within the presidential palace. A 
60% increase in the national minimum salary decreed by the President was the limit. 
The cardinal and retired army generals were invited to comment on radio and TV on 
the dangers of communism. Right-wing opponents and the military leadership started 
negotiations about the convenience of a corrective coup. The military staff asked 
a donation of US$ 10 million; the Honduran elite could however only amass US$ 
5 million in cash on short notice and the generals happily agreed.31 The coup was, 
in strictly military terms, a success. However, politically it resulted in disaster. All 
member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) reacted with dismay. 
The appointed interim government became a regional pariah and had to organise new 
elections. 
Military of the left
Military men are not inevitably inclined to the political right. Throughout the 
entire twentieth century, there were revolutionary lieutenants and captains. In the 
1920s, rebellions erupted by young officers who in later years were characterised as 
the ‘Military Youth’ in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador.32 Also in later decades, Military 
Youth in Central America participated in rebellions with reformist agendas.33 In 
1960, young lieutenants in Guatemala with a nationalist and anti-imperialist agenda 
overthrew a military dictatorship and, after its failure, organised the first guerrilla 
groups in that country. In 1982 and 1983, young officers were instrumental in the 
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overthrow of the two merciless dictators, Generals Lucas García and Ríos Montt. In 
1972 and 1979, they were the actors behind the two last military coups in El Salvador 
before the civil war. It was a desperate effort to prevent large-scale guerrilla warfare.
More renowned were the governments of nationalist-leftist military leaders who 
used the armed forces to implement anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist nationalisations 
and pro-poor social reforms after World War II. Many of them and their younger 
military ministers were of lower middle-class backgrounds or the precarious urban 
working class.34 They were elected or staged a coup and sought legitimisation by 
elections and/or by mass organisations. Colonel Arbenz (1950–1954) in Guatemala 
was the first one. He was elected president, maintaining his army rank, and initiated 
an Agrarian Reform while nationalising American property. His political successors, 
Generals Velasco Alvarado in Peru and Torrijos in Panama, headed institutional coups 
in the same year, 1968. 
Like the Velasco government in Peru, Panamanian army chief Torrijos announced 
a social reform programme for the benefit of the poor.35 Both were passionate 
nationalists with sympathy for the underprivileged. Both defined themselves as 
military reformers with a special mission to break the power of the economic and 
political oligarchy, to restore national control over the economy, and to carry out 
social reforms, implemented by the armed forces. Here is a quote from a discourse 
by Torrijos (that could have been uttered by either Velasco or three decades later by 
Chávez): 
I am a soldier of Latin America who lives his daily life in the 
barracks since I was seventeen years old. That gives me the right, and 
knowledge, to treat a delicate, complex and sensitive subject […]. 
Since 1959, the year in which, utterly remarkably in our century, a 
guerrilla triumphs over a regular army in Cuba, at the peak of the 
period of McCarthyism, military schools began to analyse a problem 
that had not been recognised previously. What had happened in Cuba? 
And why? […]: social terror, terrorism, ‘exotic theories’. No, no, the 
real breeding ground for these so-called exotic theories is [poverty 
and] misery. The real cause is the lack of schools, the lack of provision 
of potable water, the lack of a national development programme […]. 
Many common soldiers, sergeants and lieutenants, men who live in 
the same [circumstances of] misery in which ordinary people live, 
realise quickly that their rifles should be targeted at those who enslave 
[…].36 
Military reformism was not restricted to Panama and Peru. Other army chiefs 
followed suit and adopted similar, albeit more modest, programmes: in 1971 in Bolivia 
(Generals Obando [1969–1970] and Torres [1970–1971]) and in Ecuador (General 
Rodríguez Lara [1972]). In retirement, several of the reformist military founded an 
NGO (non-governmental organisation) for progressive former officers.37 
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At present (March 2019), we may be witnessing the emergence of a new variety 
of political armies in a new ideological dress, that of nationalist and anti-imperialist 
‘socialism-of the twenty-first-century’. In 2010, for instance, Bolivia’s armed forces 
declared themselves a “socialist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist institution”, in 
full support of President Morales’ Plurinational State of Bolivia and the political 
ideology of the ruling MAS (Movement for Socialism) government.38 As in Bolivia 
and Peru, Venezuelan army officers are recruited from lower middle-class or labour-
class families. Lieutenant Colonel Chávez, son of schoolteachers and educated by his 
grandmother, a life-long devotee of Bolivar and admirer of Velasco and Torrijos, staged 
a coup in 1992. The coup failed.39 When he was released from jail, he campaigned for 
presidential election in slums and rural villages. Like Velasco and Torrijos, Chávez 
was embedded in the military revolutionary mystique that supposes the indivisible 
unity between people and the Army. In his own words: 
We can say that it is like the formula of water: H2O. If we say that 
the People are the oxygen, the Armed Force is the hydrogen. Water 
doesn’t exist without hydrogen.40 
During the fifteen years of Chávez’s presidency (1999–2013), his political 
trajectory demonstrated a deepening radicalism.41 A new constitution in 1999 
established the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He survived a (failed) coup in 
2002 and a (failed) general strike organised by heterogeneous alliances of opposing 
military and political leaders. After purging the armed institutions, he eventually 
founded his own political party, a mixture of leftist political parties and social 
movements.42 His political management reflects a mixture of mass movements and 
use of the armed forces in civilian administration. In the mid-2000s, Chávez started 
expanding his reach, emphasising his ‘socialism of the twenty-first century’: a large 
series of domestic social and economic ‘missions’, headed by trusted military and 
loyal civilians. The Venezuelan armed force, now the ‘National Bolivarian Armed 
Force’, gradually became the executive instrument of the president.43 Between 2008 
and 2015, the armed force’s budget grew from 1,06% to 4,61% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP). Military personnel increased from 117 400 in 2010 to 197 744 in 
2014 (from 40 to 63 per 10 000 citizens). In 2015, the number of (auxiliary) people’s 
militias stood at 365 046 organised in ‘integral defence areas’ and ‘military strategic 
defence regions’ under military command.44
The social and political divide in Venezuela, already visible during Chávez’s last 
years, became catastrophic under his successor Maduro’s presidency (2013–present). 
After elections in January 2016, the opposition dominated parliament, but in May 
2016, the government declared an emergency situation and organised elections for 
a Constituent Assemblée that de facto took over all parliamentary functions. Since 
then, the president rules by decree. Civilian ministries and management functions 
were increasingly transferred to the military.45 Military officers in active service or 
in retirement occupied key cabinet positions. Important sectors and strategic public 
instruments, such as tax collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, 
purchases and acquisitions of the public sector, public imports, control over the public 
banks and the superintendence of banks are all managed by military officers as well.46 
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Already under Chávez, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces were a powerful 
instrument, acting as both the right arm (defence and internal security) end the left 
arm (in charge of ministries, the ‘ missions’ and economic management) of the 
president.47 The military also entered the realm of essentially civilian administration. 
Chávez’s successor, civilian President Maduro, extended this system of selecting only 
fierce Chavista military loyalists. General Vladimir Padrino, commander-in-chief in 
2013, was made Minister of Defence in 2014 and remain in charge until the present. 
Confronted with political mayhem and economic calamity, Maduro systematically 
transferred executive power to the military echelons. Currently, General Padrino 
oversees national defence, manages the national economy, at the same time 
monitoring all other social missions and is the de facto cabinet prime minister. The 
Armed Forces control 51% of the entire national budget.48 They also are in charge of 
the most vital cabinet positions: Defence, Interior, Justice, Alimentation, Housing, 
Public Works, Transport, and Electricity. The situation became even more complicated 
when in January 2019, the new president of the (original) parliament, Juan Gaidó, 
declared himself interim president. At present, Venezuela has two parliaments and 
two presidents. However, the Military High Command staunchly supports President 
Maduro (March 2019). The regime’s future is strongly dependent on the loyalty of his 
military supporters.  
Democratic transition and nostalgia for military leadership
The implosion of the Soviet Union, the transition of China as an emerging state 
capitalist power, and, of course, the wave of democratic transitions in the region 
ceased to sustain the national security doctrines of the Cold War era. With the 
exception of Colombia (where one guerrilla movement is still fighting) there are no 
armed insurgency movements with a politico-military agenda left. At present, Latin 
America and the Caribbean are ruled by elected governments. However, except for 
Argentina, all democratic transitions in Latin America were accompanied by explicit 
amnesties or pardon legislation. This created – and still causes – an impunity problem 
with respect to human rights violations committed by the security forces during the 
dictatorships. Special legislation and the easy delegation of judicial processes to the 
military justice system favour the practice of relative immunity in Brazil, Colombia, 
the northern triangle of Central America, Peru and other countries.
With the return to democracy in Latin America, a kind of civil–military 
accommodation process took place. Political militarism was abandoned, but the 
phenomenon of military politicians did not disappear; in some countries it was only 
modernised. In general, the Latin American and Caribbean electorates maintain a 
weak spot concerning soldiers in politics and former military strongmen of the left 
and the right. I already mentioned the case of President Chávez in Venezuela between 
1999 and 2013. The region even witnessed the election of the presidency by former 
conservative dictators as doctored democrats: In Bolivia, former dictator General 
Banzer won the presidential elections in 1998. In Guatemala, Banzer’s colleague, 
former dictator General Rios Montt, was invested with the Presidency of the national 
Congress in 1999. His party had won the elections, and President Portillo figured 
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as his figurehead while Rios Montt coordinated the cabinet. In 2010 and 2015, two 
times putchist and ex-dictator Bouterse, condemned drug dealer (in The Netherlands) 
and accused of torture and murder by a military tribunal (in Suriname), won the 
presidential elections of Surinam. Again in Guatemala, former General Pérez Molina 
was elected president in 2011. Campaigning under the banner of law and order, and 
heavily supported by the national billionaire elite, he, his vice-president and his key 
cabinet members went to jail for corruption in the last year of his term. 
Notwithstanding previous experiences under military dictatorships, the public’s 
confidence in the armed forces remained high. In most public opinion polls in the 
region (a consistent phenomenon in the yearly reports of the Latinobarómetro for 
twenty years), the confidence in institutions is, in descending order:49 
•	 the churches – 66%; 
•	 the armed forces – 50%; 
•	 the police – 38%; 
•	 the electoral institutions – 32%; 
•	 the government – 26%; 
•	 the judiciary – 28%; 
•	 the parliament – 25%; and 
•	 the political parties – 17%. 
At least in part, the continuous prestige of the military is explained by the 
development tasks that the military traditionally performs in garrisons and 
deployments in remote areas: infrastructure, medical service, and sometimes transport 
in emergency situations. 
Conclusions: New military security missions and ‘unconventional’ 
counterinsurgency 
In Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, civilian governments formally 
established internal security missions to the armed assigned by presidential decrees 
and/or parliamentary legislation to the Armed Forces to act in new missions of 
internal security and development. The development missions are an extension of 
the already mentioned civilian assistance missions in remote or underdeveloped and 
faraway regions. The new missions refer to environmental issues, protection of the 
biodiversity, role expanding as key actors in ‘civil defence’ and assistance in natural 
disasters.50 Emphasis is also put on participation in peace missions. During the last 
decades, military contingents of many Latin American countries participated in 
foreign peace missions, operating under a United Nations mandate. These missions 
are continued to the present.51 From 2004 on, Brazil and Chile headed the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).52 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru 
created special peacekeeping schools.53
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Other recent missions are not related to external defence or internal development. 
After the democratisation of the entire region and the end of civil wars in Central 
America and the Andean countries (Colombia and Peru), new waves of violence 
and new armed actors appeared in the form of local mini-wars in favelas (low- and 
middle-income, and unregulated neighbourhoods in Brazil), popular neighbourhoods 
and rural corridors of drug trafficking. In many countries, civilian governments and 
parliaments provide binding legislation to the armed forces to act in new missions of 
internal security, to ‘assist the police’ or even to assume command of the operations 
against cartels and crime syndicates, youth gangs, and urban vigilantes. However, 
rough military and police detachments, private security companies and violent law 
enforcement agencies are also the actors or partners in the so-called ‘new violence’ 
in Latin America.54 
Between 2000 and 2017, more than 2,5 million Latin Americans have been killed 
by violence, generally by intentional homicide. In 2012, Latin America’s citizens 
represented only 8% of the world’s population; however, they produced 33% of the 
world’s homicides in 2012, and this trend is not declining. 55With the exception of drug-
related violence in Colombia, Central America and Mexico, Latin American violence 
is predominantly urban. According to the Mexican NGO Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, 
from the 50 most lethal cities of 300 000 inhabitants or more in the world in 2016, 
42 are in Latin America (and one, Kingston, in the English-speaking Caribbean).56 
Of these Latin American cities, 19 are in Brazil, 8 in Mexico, 7 in Venezuela and 4 
in Colombia. Caracas is the most violent city with 130 assassinations per 100 000 
inhabitants. Most of the victims live in urban peripheries, are male, young, non-white, 
and killed by firearms. This ‘new warfare’ was not limited to urban territories, but 
quickly expanded to rural areas in Colombia, Central America and Mexico.
The presence of drugs, the cultivation, transformation, commerce and smuggling 
of cocainepoppy and marihuana, produced an expansion of violence by non-state 
and state actors, and in some countries caused more victims than in the decades of 
civil wars. The focus on the ‘war on drugs’ implies a permanent intertwining of US 
anti-drug agencies and national police and military forces. This imposes a militaristic 
approach to the drug problem. After 9/11, this has been strengthened by the fusion 
of the ‘war on dugs’ and ‘war on terror’ discourses that engage with the connection 
between drug trafficking and armed actors that challenge the violence monopoly 
of states in the region. However, as we will illustrate below with a few examples, 
this militarisation of internal law enforcement has not (yet) led to the impending re-
militarisation of politics, but has rather accentuated the intrinsically violent nature of 
democracy in Latin America.57
Reluctantly or not, given the absence of external warfare, Latin American armed 
forces have assumed a multiplicity of internal security missions: 
•	 the military as provider of internal security; 
•	 the military as parallel police force; 
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•	  the military as principal actor of internal warfare, be it against ‘terrorists’ 
or ‘organised crime’; 
•	 the military as pacifier in slum wars; 
•	 the military as the ultimate resort against gang lords in the drugs corridors. 
Eventually, one can observe a reciprocal process: the militarisation of the police 
with ‘Special Police Forces’ trained in urban warfare and armed with heavy weaponry. 
Even the language of these ‘civilian missions’ is embedded in soldiers’ semantic: the 
war against crime, the war against terrorists, and the war against drugs. Some of 
the new missions are far-going role extensions. However, all new missions are being 
requested or at least permitted by democratically elected governments and are based 
on legal charters. This is a fundamental difference in comparison with the decades 
of military dictatorship where hidden and veiled intelligence and security operations 
were executed by paramilitary forces and death squads, without constitutional or 
legitimate mandates.
What is, however, beyond legitimacy is the phenomenon of coups by invitation or 
self-coups by elected presidents. In the recent past, the self-coup by elected President 
Fujimori in Peru (1991) was extremely successful. Afterwards, he governed by decree 
and was re-elected in 1995 with an overwhelming majority of 64%. His colleague, 
elected President Serrano in Guatemala, followed his example, but his self-coup failed. 
The military was divided over its consequences and along with mass demonstrations 
against the take-over decided to transfer power to the Congress. The negotiated coup in 
2019 against Honduran President Zelaya technically succeeded but the new government 
was tainted, and the country was transformed into an international pariah until externally 
controlled elections had been organised. 
Venezuela under Maduro is another case of contention. After legislative elections 
in December 2015, the president was confronted by a new parliament (Assemblée) in 
which the opposition had won a two-thirds majority. The president organised elections 
for a new Constitutional Congress, the opposition boycotted elections, and Maduro 
won a devoted membership. He transferred all legislative functions to this new body, 
and in 2017, organised contested elections for municipal mayors and state governors. 
The incumbent president was re-elected for a second six-year term. In his cabinet, 
all key functions were consigned to loyal generals. All strategic public institutions – 
tax collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, purchases and acquisitions 
within the public sector, public imports, control over the public banks and the 
superintendence of banks – were managed by junior generals and colonels. In fact, the 
armed forces were the regime’s right arm (executive functions) and the left (repression 
by the military National Guard) 
A completely new situation has arisen in Brazil. During the impeachment procedure 
against President Rousseff, politicians of the right and the left invited the military high 
command to pronounce political statements. Initially, the answer was negative, but in 
the subsequent process against former president Lula, the general staff voiced their 
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preferences. Prior to and during the presidential elections in 2018, far-right congressman, 
Bolsonaro’s, a former army captain who repeatedly expressed his admiration for 
Brazil’s military dictatorship, announced his plan to appoint the military in key posts 
and to clean the country while dealing with his adversaries. At present (March 2019), 
it is too early to predict the political course of the country. Bolsonaro’s own party 
has only a small number of seats and he will have to accommodate politically close 
and distant allies to rule with a majority in Congress. His veiled bidding to the armed 
forces to co-govern, however, opens the way for the military in politics. The last word 
about the future of Latin American political Armies has not been spoken yet. 
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